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Abstract 
This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stake in implementing the 
competition of the rail mode in the long distance passenger market either by means of franchise 
or by an open access mechanism. We simulate the outcomes of competition in and for the market 
using a differentiated-products oligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition 
in a long distance passenger market. Specifically we first calibrate the model using data describing  
high speed lines in France and show that the incumbent railway operator’s strategy does not 
simply boil down to a short-term profit maximization (e.g., because of existing regulation or limit-
pricing strategy). This yields two important results when simulating competition. First, whether 
it is for or in the market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in prices in 
favor of passengers. Second, the effects of opening up to competition for the market are relatively 
predictable and potentially positive, while those of opening up to competition in the market 
remain very uncertain. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With the 4th railway package, the European Union has set a legal framework that provides 
for an opening to competition of high speed passenger services from 2020 onwards. The stated 
objective is to induce a downward pressure on costs as well as a strengthening of the offer of 
services for the benefit of the passenger. To do so, this framework advocates as base method, an 
open access policy, also called competition in the market, that is to say, an opening of the market to 
allow several operators to run trains on the same line, and leaves it to each Member States to 
precise the modalities on its own network. 
However, access to a railway infrastructure requires a prior allocation of train paths, which 
could require the regulator to auction, for an entire market (for instance, an origin-destination 
link), a certain number of train slots, without determining in advance the number of operators 
that would ultimately be providing the transport services. When only one operator is selected, 
this framework is classified under the category of competition for the market where competitive 
pressure occurs ex ante, i.e., each time the auction process is renewed. It is similar to the allocation 
of rail franchises. 
This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stake in implementing the 
competition of the rail mode in the long distance passenger market either by means of franchise 
or by an open access mechanism. 
 
European experiences 
This question is all the more important as the experiences of open access in Europe do not 
seem successful so far. While a regulation in 2014 allowed open access to rail in fifteen European 
countries, it has been effective in only six countries, and this in a very limited way outside the 
Italian case. 
An open access scheme was introduced in Germany in 1994 in the freight and long-
distance passenger transport. Access to the network is based on the free demand of the 
competitors of DeutscheBahn, without any particular regulation being provided for the pricing of 
access. (See Link, 2004.) Between 2000 and 2010, there were 10 attempts to enter the long-distance 
market, all of them with a very limited volume (no more than 2 round trips per day). Six of them 
closed after a relatively short period. (See Séguret, 2010.) At the end of this period, the total market 
share of the operators who accessed the network in open access remained below 1%. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the bulk of passenger transport is provided by 
companies that have obtained regional franchises through a tendering procedure. Today, there 
are 16 regional franchises on the British market. The Office of Rail and Road (i.e., the rail regulator) 
can however grant an open access to operators on certain routes via a codified procedure. The 
first operator in open access was the company Hull trains which obtained in 2000 the rights for a 
period of 10 years (extended since then to 2016) to operate between London and Hull a service 
comprising 7 trains per day in 2011. The company Grand Central was then granted train slots 
connecting London to Sunderland in 2007 and then Bradford in 2009. A third operator, Wrexham 
and Shropshire, got train slots to Wrexham but withdrew three years later due to the lack of 
profitability of these routes. In total, open access traffic now accounts for less than 1% of traffic 
measured in passenger kilometers in the United Kingdom. (See Competition & Market Authority, 
2015 and 2016.) 
In these two examples, the market share of operators entering in open access is very low, 
both at national level (less than 1% for all these operators) and at each route (less than 5% in the 
United Kingdom, between 5 and 10% in Germany). 
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Examples exist, however, where such operators have obtained a more significant market 
share on a few markets, in particular in Czech Republic where two operators have a combined 
market share of between 40% and 50% on the Prague-Ostrava route since 2012 and in Austria 
where the operator Winbah’s market share is around 25% on the Vienna-Salzburg route. In both 
countries, access to the rail network is not restricted a priori, but market competition has only 
been effective on a single link. Sweden is not an exception: Three operators are present on the 
three main long-distance links in the Stockholm-Gothenburg-Malmö triangle and are providing 
highly differentiated services, in particular cheaper and slower trains than the incumbent 
operator, for a total market share of less than 2%. Note, however, that, in 2015, a new operator 
entered in direct competition with the incumbent on the Stockholm-Gothenburg route. 
Italy is in fact the only case where the market share of the operator that entered in open 
access is significant. The operator NTV, entered on the market in 2012, thus reached in 2013 a 
market share in the order of 22% on two high-speed lines, Turin-Milan-Venice and Milan-Rome-
Naples. This entry was not made without difficulty. The new entrant seems to have suffered the 
lack of possibility to buy rolling stock; the incumbent owning the existing rolling stock, NTV had 
to make heavy investments. The regulator sought to correct this discriminatory situation as early 
as 2013 by uniformly reducing the infrastructure access charges. 
In the light of these examples, the outcome of open access in the railway industry is 
therefore mixed. However, when a competition in the market is put in place significantly, it seems 
to induce positive effects for the passenger. According to Bergantino, Capozza and Capurso (2015) 
and Bergantino and Capurso (2015), the open access in the Italian market would have led to an 
overall increase in rail supply and a significant transport price decrease (i.e., including the fares 
of air tickets) without leading the incumbent operator to engage in a too aggressive price war.  
These facts call for an examination of the viability of the open access policy as the method 
to open the rail markets to competition. 
Now, competition for the market does not always generate the expected efficiency gains 
either. For the United Kingdom, several studies tend to show that the opening to competition for 
the market has not significantly improved the efficiency of operators. According to Smith, Nash 
and Wheat (2009) and to Smith and Wheat (2012), the cost of franchised operators increased 
between 1997 and 2006, a finding that led the British regulator to consider different avenues to 
increase competition in this sector, mixing competition for and in the market.1 (See the Report of 
the Office of Rail and Road, 2015.) 
 
Literature 
The economic research has identified different causes that could explain the outcomes of 
the opening to the rail market from various angles. First, they are related to factors pertaining to 
demand such as the Mohring effect. Losing market shares implies for the incumbent a decrease in 
the frequency of its trains on the link in competition, which reduces its attractiveness on this 
market for the consumers and also threatens its profits on other adjacent adjacent services because 
of complementarities of demand on contiguous sections of the rail network. Hence, the pattern of 
demand may explain why the incumbent is proving to be a more aggressive competitor than its 
operating costs would suggest. (See Seabright, 2003.) 
Second, the rail industry is characterized by significant economies of scale, more precisely 
by economies of density and scope. The immediate consequence is that we can not expect many 
competitors in a rail market. These economies of scale depend on the characteristics of the 
                                                     
1 For a review of the state of rail competition in Europe, see also Nash (2018). 
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operator in terms of size or type of network, notably with economies of scope being increasing or 
decreasing depending on the case, and economies of density being increasing depending on the 
mode of opening to competition. (See Smith and Wheat, 2015.) Recent work by Rasmussen, Smith 
and Wheat (2015) finds a cost-elasticity to density of 0.32 for a new entrant and of the order of 1 
for the franchised operator. In these conditions, differences of cost efficiencies among operators 
can play a crucial role in the process of opening to competition. 
The economic literature has also documented the effects of the opening to competition. 
For the United Kingdom, the role of demand and the choice of transport modes has been 
emphasized in articles based on the PRAISE model. (See Preston, Wardman and Whelan, 1999, 
Preston, Holvad and Raje, 2002, and Johnson and Nash, 2012.) These articles predict the impact of 
fares and services on the volume of rail traffic per operator, based on multiple scenarios, but do 
not model the strategic behavior of operators. For Spain, Álvarez, Cantos, Moner and Sempere 
(2015) consider the two lines connecting Madrid to Seville and to Valencia. They use traffic and 
price data to calibrate their model of demand and general data available in the literature on the 
operational costs of rail and air transport as well as infrastructure access charges communicated 
by the operators themselves to calibrate their supply model. (See Campos and De Rus, 2009 and 
Swan ad Adler, 2006.) Their analysis shows that open access would have a positive effect in terms 
of social welfare only if it generates a price reduction sufficient to lead to an increase in traffic of 
about 25%. Their assumption on the costs of the new entrant, which are 25% lower than those of 
the incumbent operator, does not allow to reach this volume of traffic, which leads the authors to 
provide a negative judgment on the opening in open access. Note that these conclusions are based 
on the idea that the incumbent maximizes social welfare today, not profit. This approach leads 
them to assume that the new entrant practices higher prices, and thus induces both a 
diversification of supply and a rise in prices. 
For Germany, Ivaldi and Vibes (2008) propose a simulation model to analyze inter and 
intra-modal competition on the Cologne-Berlin route, simulating the entry of a low cost rail 
operator which provides the same service as the incumbent, but has marginal costs half as high. 
In this specific market, there is inter- and intra- modal competition. This article shows that the 
entry of a low-cost rail operator is possible, it would lead to a price reduction of 30% and it would 
capture more than 25% of market share to the detriment of the incumbent and air carriers, with a 
strong positive impact on social welfare. The assumption on the costs of the low-cost operator is 
however strong compared to the observations, i.e., a division by two of marginal costs compared 
to those of the existing railway service. The main lesson of this article is that the equilibrium on 
the market depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from other modes of transport. 
 
Methodology 
Building on this literature, we propose here to assess the costs and benefits of opening the 
rail market to competition by simulating the outcomes of competition in and for the market using 
a differentiated-products oligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition in a 
long distance passenger market. It is a benchmark model extensively applied to quantitatively 
assess the degree of competition in a given market or to measure consumer harms in anti-
competitive cases. In this setup, the transport services supplied by the operators are differentiated 
in terms of quality, which notably depends on typical transport characteristics like the frequency 
of the service; on a given market (i.e., a city-pair) consumers (i.e., potential passengers) choose a 
transport service (namely, a transport mode) as well as an operator; and operators strategically 
decide on prices for the service they provide. This tool allows us to derive the market equilibrium 
conditions (i.e., market shares, prices and profits of operators, consumer surplus of consumers) 
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and to simulate various scenarios depending on the mechanism chosen to open the rail sector to 
competition. It is designed to be calibrated and used with a limited amount of detailed data. 
Specifically, we consider the link between Paris and Marseille whose distance by road is 
around 750 kilometers, which allows for intermodal competition between road, rail and air 
transport modes. We consider the leisure segment on which four competitors operate: the national 
rail operator, an airline, the private car operator (a driver operating his/her own car) and a car 
sharing operator. We also look at the business segment of the Paris-Bordeaux market where only 
the rail and air competitors are present. In both cases, passengers may finally decide not to travel. 
 
Results 
Two main lessons can be drawn from our simulations. First, whether it is for or in the 
market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in prices in favor of passengers. 
On the contrary, they could increase significantly if some form of tariff distortion experienced by 
the historical monopoly today were to be relaxed. The calibration of the model tends to show that 
the actual prices of the incumbent are significantly below what would be optimal for a company 
in a monopoly position on the rail mode that would maximize its short-term profit without 
constraint. This low level of margins could equally well be interpreted in terms of supply, which 
would emerge at a higher level because of a voluntarist policy. Further work remains to be done 
to better understand what determines today these distortions favorable to users. These may result 
from the current price regulation, the rail operator's strategy to anticipate a possible tightening of 
this regulation or the entry of a competitor, or as the result of political pressure likely to lead to 
the deployment of a too expensive network and offer of service. At the extreme, the simulations 
carried out indicate that, if the opening to competition leads to the total elimination of all tariff 
distortions, the price increase could reach 24% depending on the scenario considered. 
Second, the effects of opening up to competition for the market are relatively predictable - 
and potentially positive - while those of opening up to competition in the market remain very 
uncertain. In the former case, it should be possible in principle to maintain the general tariff 
distortion towards lower prices mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the supposedly best 
efficiency of the franchise operator would then automatically translate into a gain for the 
passenger. Indeed, a 10% reduction of operating expenses leads to a 3% decrease in prices. In the 
latter case, the downward pressure on prices would naturally relax, and competition from the 
new entrant would not always counteract this effect. This will strongly depend on the number of 
train slots granted to the new entrant: An insufficient number of slots would lead to conceding a 
derisory market share of a few percent and prevent a priori any entry as was observed in 
Germany, while a balanced sharing as in Italy would, in France, allow an effective entry with a 
potentially positive but very uncertain effect for the passenger. 
This rather leads to advocate the passage of calls for tenders on a line (or a set of lines) cut 
into a few packets of slots, likely to entrust the operation to two or even a single company 
depending on the result of the call for tenders. In this latter case, there would be competition for 
the market with only one franchise operator, whereas the former case would be similar to in the 
market competition with the public authorities predefining the terms of the line sharing. This 
approach would have the advantage of a more complete questioning of the organization of the 
network and would thus be more likely to lead to efficiency gains.2 
                                                     
2 In a recent report, Nash, Crozet, Nilsson and Link (2016) reach a similar conclusion as they wrote: “In the case of on-
track competition, which mainly affects high-speed rail, it will be very difficult to establish head-on competition 
between SNCF and a new entrant on the most profitable lines, given that capacity is limited. […] Just as in PSO services, 
as suggested by C. Nash (2009) or J. Preston (2009), competition in the high-speed segment in France can probably only 
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Map of the analysis 
We implement this analysis in the following way. In Section 2, we present the data needed 
to calibrate the model. Section 3 introduces the model of intra- and inter- modal competition 
between transport alternatives. The calibration is discussed in Section 4 while Section 5 examines 
the results of the simulation of the competition for and in the market. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data 
 
To develop our model of intermodal competition and a methodology to analyze it, we 
consider two important markets in France, namely Paris-Marseille and Paris-Bordeaux, both 
connected with a high speed infrastructure. Both these origin-and-destination pairs connect Paris 
to two of the largest French cities, with respective distances of 750 km and 570 km. These routes 
represent a significant share of total long distance passenger traffic in France. Because of 
geographical, cultural and economic features, these routes attract a diversity of passengers, 
mainly business and leisure passengers, which probably explains the differentiation in available 
transport services. Three main passenger travel modes are offered on these links: rail, road 
(private car and carpooling) and air. 3  The rail service, provided with the high speed train 
technology, allows for a real competition in terms of travel time between air and rail transport on 
these specific distances. Private car presents the advantage of a great flexibility in departure times 
and the recent emergence of the carpooling platforms offers a low cost option for traveling by car. 
We assume here that private car and carpooling are not relevant competing options for business 
passengers. 
Most of the data on traffic, prices and marginal costs is provided by SNCF Réseau for one 
year, namely 2016. We use annual traffic data for one-way tickets on both links, for the two 
business and leisure segments. Note that rail traffic from servicemen, SNCF beneficiaries and 
concessions to large families are not included in these data as their favorable fare conditions are 
imposed by the State and make these passengers captive to the option of traveling with the rail 
mode. This sub-population corresponds to 8% of rail traffic or 4% of total traffic on these links. 
For every transport mode (except for private car) and the two main categories of passengers, the 
price measured in euros corresponds to the weighted average price paid by the different 
passengers. The values for marginal costs are computed as the sums of unit operating costs and 
unit tolls, on each link. Marginal costs are assumed to be the same for business and leisure 
transport services, as confirmed by the representatives of SNCF Réseau who provided the data 
used in this model. The price paid by one passenger traveling by car is computed as the sum of 
fuel and tolls expenses for one car (recovered from Viamichelin.com) divided by the average 
number of passengers seating in one car, set to 2.22 passengers, according to the Enquête 
Nationale Transports et Déplacements (2008). 
All data available are gathered in Table 1. Only these data are used at the calibration stage. 
Given the similarities of data for the leisure segment on both markets, we provide and discuss the 
results of simulations for the Paris-Marseille market. For the business segment, we comment 
                                                     
emerge through tendering and franchising.” 
3 The rail mode is provided by one operator only, i.e., the French incumbent, SNCF. The air transport service is provided 
by different operators on the links we are considering here. However, the main French operator, i.e., AIR FRANCE, is 
largely dominant on these markets. We then consider that de facto there is only one air operator. The car sharing option 
is mainly offered by a new entrant called BlaBlaCar. We do not consider buses here as this mode were negligible on the 
two routes during the period under investigation.  
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below the results from the Paris-Bordeaux market where the market share of the air mode is 
relatively high.4 
 
 
Table 1: Data for the competition model 
 
Market Paris – Marseille Paris - Bordeaux 
Passenger type Leisure Business Leisure Business 
 MS(1) Price(2) MC(3) MS Price MC MS Price MC MS Price MC 
Rail 54.8% 64.9 49.1 85.2% 84.2 49.9 37.3% 57.8 41.2 64.3% 74.2 41.2 
Air 8.4% 86.3 53.9 14.8% 118.1 53.9 11.3% 81.2 41.5 35.7% 111.0 41.5 
Car 34.6% 59.1     45.5% 45.5     
Car pooling 2.2% 44.3     5.9% 33.3     
Notes: (1) MS means market share; (2) Prices are measured in Euros; (3) MC means marginal cost and is measured in Euros. 
 
 
3. A Model of Intermodal Competition 
 
Here we present a framework aimed at capturing intermodal competition between 
transport alternatives. We only consider the short-run price competition among transport 
operators assuming that they have previously defined their transport services. In other words we 
do not look at the intertemporal relation between the design of products and the pricing strategy. 
We first describe the demand side, and then characterize the determination of prices by operators 
involved in a Bertrand-Nash competition. 
 
3.1. Demand side 
 
We consider the choices made by potential passengers willing to travel on a link between 
two cities (for instance between Paris and Marseille) in terms of mode and service provided. Four 
transport options are available on the link: rail, air, personal car, car-pooling. The alternatives are 
characterized by a quality parameter and a price. In addition we assume the existence of an 
outside alternative: Instead of choosing one of the services offered to travel from Paris to Marseille, 
consumers may decide not to travel. Hence the total market size is defined as the number of 
consumers who would be potentially interested in making the trip. 
The potential passengers for a one way trip on the link are heterogeneous. We consider 
two main categories in the passengers’ population: Business and leisure passengers. There are 
potential passengers on the business and leisure markets who may either travel using one of the 
transport services supplied, or otherwise choose not to travel, which is herein the outside 
alternative. We are going to assume that business passengers use only the rail and air modes, 
whereas the leisure passengers can use any mode (rail, air, personal car, car-pooling). These two 
types of passengers differ by their own valuations for the characteristics of transport services and 
their own sensitivity to prices (our assumption that business passengers only use the air and rail 
modes amounts to imposing that their valuations for the two road options are extremely 
negative). In what follows, we account for these two types of passengers by considering two 
separate markets: The business market and the leisure market. In this way, the calibration 
procedure we follow produces two sets of parameters characterizing the different tastes and 
willingness-to-pay of the two groups of customers. In the sequel, we describe in details the leisure 
                                                     
4 Detailed results of simulations for the different markets are available upon request. 
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market, adaptations to the business market are straightforward. 
Assume that there are N  potential passengers on this market. Each consumer makes her 
choice among the alternatives in the following way: An alternative, or a product, is a combination 
of a transport mode and a service provided by a transport operator. Note that, for personal car 
alternative, the transport operator is the driver in her car. There are 5  alternatives, where 
alternative = 0j  corresponds to the outside alternative (herein, OG) and the other four 
alternatives, corresponding to rail, air, personal car and carpooling, are denoted by = 1,..., 4j , in 
this order. 
Consumers’ utility depends on quality and prices. We attribute a quality index  j  and a 
price jp  to every alternative. The utility function of passenger i associated with the alternative j  
is given by: 
 
 =ij j ijU V , (1) 
 
where the deterministic component jV , defined as 
 
  =j j jV hp , (2) 
 
represents the mean utility level common to every passenger and the random component ij  
corresponds to the departure of passenger i from the common utility level, specific to product j
, i.e., to the passenger i’s unknown preferences for product j. Parameter h , which measures the 
rate of change between quality and price, is called the marginal utility of income. Since the quality 
and the price of the outside alternative are undefined, we assume that: 
 
 = 0 for = 0jV j . (3) 
 
We also assume a logit specification for the random preferences of the representative 
passenger. Therefore the market share of alternative j (  = 0,1,..., 4j ) is obtained as the logit 
probability: 
 
 
 
 


0
exp
=
exp
j
j
k
k
V
s
V
, (4) 
 
and =j jN s N  is the number of passenger choosing alternative j . Note that if one observes the 
number of passengers that select one of the four transport modes, one does not know 0N , the 
number of individuals choosing not to travel. Hence we do not observe N either. 
Following Berry (1994), this specification yields the passenger demand function as: 
 
      0ln ln =j j js s hp . (5) 
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Differentiating with respect to jp  and noting that 



0
0= j
j
s
hs s
p
, we obtain the own price 
elasticities of demand as: 
 
   = 1 for = 1,..., 4j j jhp s j . (6) 
 
3.2. Supply side 
 
We assume that the rail and air modes are each offered by a different firm taking as given 
the other alternatives and strategically choosing its prices so as to maximize its profit. By contrast, 
the operators on the road mode (personal car and carpooling) are not strategic actors; they simply 
set a price equal to their marginal cost. 
The strategic decision of rail and air operators is described as follows. If jc  is the marginal 
cost of providing the transport service by firm j and if K  is a fixed cost, the profit function of firm 
j is given by 
 
    =j j j jp c q K . (7) 
 
When the transport firms maximize their profit, they choose prices so that their margins, 
measured as the Lerner index, are equal to the willingnes-to-pay of their clients, which is 
measured as the inverse of the own price elasticity, that is to say, so that: 
 
 

 1
=
j j
j j
p c
p
. (8) 
 
It means that the firm prices the transport service so as to extract all the rent from the passenger. 
However, a transport operator can be subject to some form of regulation and governance 
contraints or can attempt to protect its market share in the future. In that case, it might internalize 
part of the consumer surplus when choosing its prices, where the consumer surplus associated 
with alternative j  is given by: 
 
  0= ( )
q j
j jCS P t p dt , (9) 
 
where ( )P t  is the inverse demand function. This transport firm now maximizes a weighted sum 
of its own profit and the consumer welfare, where the weight associated to the consumer welfare 
is denoted by  j  and it is called the degree of price distortion associated to the mode j. The price 
jp  now must satisfy the modified Lerner condition: 
 


 1
=
j j j
j j
p c
p
. (10) 
 
When  = 0j , we are back to the standard Lerner equation; when  = 1j , the firm fully 
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internalizes the consumer welfare, and therefore sets a price equal to its marginal cost.5 
More generally, this operator may pursue objectives other than short term profit 
maximization and this may be modeled in a variety of ways (e.g., a weighted average of multiple 
interests, such as enterprise’s profit, taxpayers’ benefit,  and consumers surplus). (See 
Sappington and Sidak 2003.) We leave the choice of objective function as an empirical question 
and test different models. More specifically, as explained below, we assume that the airline 
maximizes its profit (µ2 =0), but allow µ1, the parameter associated with the first operator, to be 
positive. Besides, we also test a specification in which the railways firm maximizes a weighted 
sum of its own profit and its revenue (instead of consumer surplus). The outcome of those tests 
are presented and discussed in section 4.2. 
 
 
4. Calibration 
 
With the data available on the two links under consideration, we cannot carry an 
econometric estimation. Our objective is to proceed to a calibration of the main parameters of our 
model in order to derive reasonnable values to be used to run simulations and counterfactuals. 
 
4.1. Methodology 
 
Calibrating the model consists in solving the system of equilibrium equations in terms of 
the unknown parameters, which are the quality indexes for the four transport modes, i.e., 
    1 2 3 4, , , , the marginal utility of income, h, and the market size N. In the case where only 
the first operator (rail) maximizes a weighted sum of its profit and the consumer surplus, one also 
needs to evaluate the degree of price distortion   1 . We assume that the second operator (air) 
maximizes its profit and that the two other operators (car and carpooling) just set their prices to 
their marginal costs. 
Then we have to calibrate seven unknown variables      1 2 3 4, , , , , ,h N  with only six 
equations, which are:  
 
 1 1
1
1
=
1
p c
N
h
N


 
 
 
, (11) 
 
 2 2
2
1
=
1
p c
N
h
N

 
 
 
, (12) 
 
 
 
 





 
1
exp
= = 1,..., 4
1 exp
j jj
k k
k
hpN
j
N hp
. (13) 
                                                     
5 Note that this is similar to a Ramsey-Boiteux problem, where a regulated firm maximizes the social welfare, with a 
Lagrange multiplier associated to its budget constraint defined as    = 1j j j . 
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It is straightforward to observe that the unknown parameters     1 2 3 4, , , , ,h N can be 
expressed as some explicit functions of  . 
The calibration takes place in two steps. First, we solve the two first equations (11) and (12) 
for h  and N  as functions of  . Second, given ( )h   and ( )N  , we solve the four demand 
equations (13) for the four unknowns  j . 
 
4.2. Application 
 
Here we apply this algorithm to solve for the unknown parameters when the equilibrium 
on each of the four markets under investigation, i.e., Paris – Marseille and Paris – Bordeaux, leisure 
and business, is characterized by a level of market shares, marginal costs and prices as they are 
gathered in Table 1. 
As explained in Section 3.2, various models are tested with respect to the first operator’s 
strategy (i.e., the rail monopoly). First, we try to calibrate the model under the assumption that 
the two first operators, i.e., rail and air, are maximizing their profits (µ=0). Solving the equilibrium 
equations (11), (12), and (13), we have not been able to find economically meaningful values for 
the parameters. We also test a specification in which the railways firm maximizes a weighted sum 
of its own profit and its revenue, but the magnitudes of the parameters of interest were highly 
unreasonable; we discarded this specification as it did not fit the data describing our markets. 
Eventually, a satisfying calibration is achieved with the model presented in Section 3.2, in which 
the first operator maximizes a weighted sum of its profit and the consumer surplus. In this setting, 
we solve the equilibrium equations for different values of the degree of price distorsion. It turns 
out that any value of   smaller than 0.4 or larger than 0.7 ended in unrealistic values for the 
other parameters. Finally, our computations have shown that the best value of   is close to 0.55. 
Those results make sense in view of the fact that the average train tickets are too low 
compared to what can be predicted by a static model in which the rail incumbent (the first 
operator here) would only maximize its short-term profit. In other words, the incumbent’s prices 
are clearly too low compared to marginal costs to be compatible with reasonable assumptions on 
price elasticities. Two main hypotheses can be put forward to explain the low average prices of 
the incumbent. First, it could be the result of a downward pressure on prices exerted by the State 
in the framework of a regulation of the railway supposed to prevent a too high pricing by the 
monopoly.6 Second, it is the outcome of a dynamic game integrating the reaction of other players, 
likely to later penalize the incumbent if it practices higher prices.7 These players could be the 
regulator, new potential entrants, but also different "stakeholders" as railway workers or regional 
authorities. In particular, the incumbent can seek to maintain a large volume of passengers, via an 
aggressive tariff policy, in order to seek to anticipate and prevent a reaction from the regulator 
that has several possible modes of action such as the opening to competition with the entry of a 
low-cost operator. The strategy of the incumbent operator would be similar to a so-called limit 
                                                     
6 In a report on the state of the French rail system, Spinetta (2018) provide evidence in support of our finding. He writes: 
“According to GoEuro, the average price in France would be 7.8 euros for 100 kilometers, against 29.7 euros in Denmark, 
28.6 euros in Switzerland, 24 euros in Austria. Italy and Germany would also have higher tariffs.” 
7 With respect to this point, note that Nash, Crozet, Nilsson and Link (2016) “mention that the historical operator has 
developed a strategy to prevent any potential price war from being initiated by a new entrant, which involves not only 
a very smart yield-management pricing system but also special ‘low-cost’ HSR services.” 
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pricing strategy (See Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, and Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000.). The 
maximization of a weighted sum of profit and consumer surplus, used in our model, can indeed 
account for these possible conducts and constraints.  
Using this value for the degree of price distorsion, the parameters of interest resulting from 
equilibrim equations (11), (12), and (13) are gathered in Table 2 below. 
 
 
Table 2: Calibrated values for the parameters of interest 
 
Market Paris – Marseille Paris - Bordeaux 
Passenger type Leisure Business Leisure Business 
 Elasticity Quality Elasticity Quality Elasticity Quality Elasticity Quality 
Rail -1.6 1.7 -1.0 0.7 -1.3 0.7 -0.9 0.7 
Air -2.7 0.5 -1.8 -0.5 -2.0 0.2 -1.6 0.7 
Car -1.5 1.0   -0.9 0.6   
Car pooling -1.4 -2.2   -0.9 -1.8   
 
 
The values of elasticities are consistent with previous findings. (See Oum et al., 1990, 
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, 2003 and Ivaldi and Vibes, 2008.) As expected they 
are higher for leisure passengers than for business passengers. 
The quality parameters reflect the objective characteristics of transport modes such as 
frequency, distribution of frequencies between peak and off-peak hours, comfort and speed, but 
also unobserved characteristics. Observe that the quality of the rail mode is somehow higher than 
the one of the air mode, which may be reflecting the advantages in terms of confort of a high speed 
train seat and the convenience to arrive in a city center. Note also that frequencies for the rail and 
air modes are both very high (14 and 24 departures per day respectiveley on the Paris-Marseille 
link), and that the door to door travel time is very similar for these two modes. 
 
 
5. Simulations 
 
Using the calibrated parameters and the structure of the model, we are in the position to 
simulate various scenarios of opening to competition on the rail market. For each scenario, we 
derive an estimate of its impact on the consumer surplus, the prices, the market share and the 
profit of the various operators, and finally the amount of tolls collected to finance the rail 
infrastructure. These scenarios are depending on factors that can decisevely affect the entry on the 
rail market. 
 
5.1. The drivers of entry 
 
The three main drivers of entry are now presented and discussed. 
 
5.1.1. The operators’ costs 
Whatever the method of opening up to competition, the assumption is that it should result 
in lower operational costs for railway operators. In case of opening to competition of the market, 
the new entrant usually benefits from variable costs (excluding tolls) lower than those of the 
incumbent, which responds to the entry by reducing its own costs. In case of opening to 
competition for the market, the competition of operators via the call for tenders launched by the 
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regulator (to choose the operator that will deliver the transport service) provides an incentive to 
a scaling down of operational costs. 
Besides operational costs, the level of access charges can also affect the decision of entry. 
However, as it is an instrument in the hand of the regulator, it should not affect the choice of type 
of competition. 
 
5.1.2. The quality of operators’ supply 
We previously introduced the parameters of quality which mainly reflect the combination 
of characteristics of various transport modes. Quality cannot be updated, upgraded or enhanced  
easily, continuously or instantaneously. It depends on the effort level of investment in the rolling 
stock to ensure a certain level or reliability or confort, in the commercial organization to provide 
an efficient assistance to customers, or in the marketing strategies to propose adequate tariffs. 
Each operator choses the level of these efforts and so affects the quality level of transport servcies.  
However, the latter is not fully in the hand of operators. It is well known that it is also 
highly determined by the frequency of trains and their distribution according to the hour of the 
day or the day of the week. In case of opening up to competition in the market, by allowing the 
new entrant more or less easy access to the network, by prioritarily allocating the "best" train paths 
to the incumbent, by making decisions regarding the management of delays and the quality of 
interconnections, the regulator is likely to influence to a great extent the quality of railway 
operators. Hence there is a great diversity of possible scenarios as to the change in the quality of 
the incumbent's offer as a result of opening up to competition and as to that of the new entrant. 
We therefore consider various scenarios reflecting this wide range of possible changes. In case of 
opening to competition for the market, however, there is less uncertainty about the evolution of 
the quality of the rail operator's offer since one can either focus on a scenario where the quality is 
maintained at its current level or is enhanced at a level required in the call for tenders launched 
by the regulator to choose the operator that will deliver the transport service. 
 
5.1.3. Change in the degree of price distortion 
The working of competition should incentivize the incumbent to change its objective to be 
closer to a pure maximization of its profit in the short term, in particular because the openess of 
the market will probably be accompanied by price deregulation and a relaxation of behavior 
aimed at anticipating such an opening. Hence we could expect a lessening in the degree of price 
distortion (that is, a decrease in µ). On the contrary, if one fears that the entry of competitors on 
the market could encourage the incumbent to engage in a predatory pricing strategy to oust its 
competitor, or if the regulator wishes to maintain some pressure on the tariffs or its requirements 
for rail accessibility, then a certain distortion of tariffs should be at least partially maintened. 
Insofar as the data available do not allow to understand precisely the reasons for the 
downward pressure on prices observed in the status quo, one cannot make reliable predictions of 
the way in which competition will affect the tariff distortion. Consequently, we carry out tests of 
sensitivity to a change in the degree of price distortion. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a 
change in tariff distortion is more plausible in the short term in the case of opening to competition 
in the market than in the case of opening for the market. Indeed, in the latter case, the regulator 
could include, in the call for tenders, constraints that incorporate the consumer surplus. 
 
5.2. Characterization of the status quo 
 
We first discuss in more detail the statusquo. This provides a benchmark to discuss the 
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other scenarios, in particular in terms of levels and changes for the main indicators like the 
consumer surplus or the profits of operators. Recall that the results in section 5.3 et 5.4 below are 
reported for the leisure segment of the Paris-Marseille market. The results for business for the 
Paris-Bordeaux market are then briefly discussed. The values characterizing the status quo are 
given in column 1 of Table A1.8  
To give an idea of the impact of the degree of price distortion, we simulate what would be 
the status quo if the distortion on prices is lessened until it fully disappears. The results are 
presented on the last three columns of Table A2. We observe that the prices of the incumbent 
would then increase by 27% and its profit by around 20%. This sharp rise in rail prices and profits 
would be to the detriment of the transport passenger as the consumer surplus decreases by 18% 
and the contribution of tolls to infrastructure funding would be reduced by 37%. Note that the 
prices for the air mode does not change much as they decrease by less than one percent.  
This constitutes an important finding of our analysis: If the opening up to competition 
ends up to diminish the degree of price distortion, by a relaxation of the tariff moderation for 
instance, it risks penalizing the consumer strongly. 
 
5.3. Opening to competition in the market 
 
For reasons explained in section 5.1.1, the scenarios for the opening to competition in the 
market are based on the assumption that the new entrant benefits from variable costs (i.e., 
operating expenses excluding tolls) 30% lower than those of the incumbent, which responds to 
the entry of a competitor in reducing its own costs by 10%.9 Considering other scenarios on the 
levels of costs of the two competitors does not provide more information on the outcome of the 
opening to competition. 
Thanks to the flexibility of the logit model, we modifiy our basic model to account for a 
new entrant which is equivalent as considering a new product. We do so by adopting a nested 
logit model which is presented in Appendix 1. It requires to calibrate the degree of correlation 
among the different alternatives, which is also explained in the appendix. 
The new entrant maximizes its short-term profit. With regard to the incumbent operator, 
the most plausible assumption is that, after the opening to competition in the market, it would 
also seek to maximize its short term profit. As previously discussed, the incumbent operator today 
maximizes a weighted sum of its profit and the consumer surplus weighted by the degree-of-
price-distortion parameter µ that reflects the existence of different sources of tariff pressures like 
price regulation, political and social environement, or long-term strategy. One can expect that the 
opening to competition in the market could lessen the strengths of these tariff constraints over 
time though. For this reason we simulate scenarios for four different values of the degree of price 
distortion, with values ranging from 100% (which correspond to the status quo) to 0% (which 
corresponds to the disappearance of any tariff pressure) with 66% et 33% as intermediate cases.  
To complete the scenarios, we need to define the quality levels of the two operators. To do 
                                                     
8 All tables are gathered in Appendix 2 at the end of the text. 
9 A level of 30% cost efficiency for an entrant is supported by many experts. See for instance MVA Consultancy and 
The Institute for Transport Studies (2011). In a more recent study, Rasmussen, Wheat and Smith (2016) assess that open 
access operators in the U.K. would benefit from significantly lower costs, up to almost 30%. Nevertheless, they do not 
specify the origin of this advantage, which seems closely linked to the regulatory framework: In the U.K., franchised 
operators pay higher tolls, have to take back the existing staff and, for those which are profitable, pay additional 
dividends to the State. New operators in open access escape all these constraints. In the absence of further refinement, 
the simulations presented here are based on ad hoc assumptions about cost reductions. This is why we consider 10% or 
30% cost efficiency depending on the scenario. 
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so, we first consider four distinct quality levels. The quality level of reference is by definition the 
quality parameter of the historical operator obtained by calibration of the model. It is referred as 
level “100%” in our simulations, since it corresponds to 100% of the quality currently available. 
The other quality levels correspond to lower quality levels. The level of quality “80%“ 
(respectively “50%” and “10%”) is defined in such a way that, starting from the status quo and all 
things being equal (that is to say without changing prices or other parameters of the model), the 
incumbent's market share decreases to 80% (respectively 50% and 10%) from its current level. 
Second we combine these quality levels to design asymmetric scenarios where the 
incumbent keeps an advantage in terms of quality compared to the entrant, and symmetric 
scenarios where both operators achieve the same levels of quality. The results for the first set of 
scenarios are reported in Table A2a and for the second set in Table A2b. 
Before commenting the results, let us look at the different forces at stake in the changes in 
prices. First, assuming that the opening to competition is accompanied with lower operating costs 
of rail operators, these efficiency gains are mechanically translated into a downward effect on 
prices. Second, assuming that the competition in the market is accompanied by a full relaxation 
of price distortions, this change in the constraints weighing on the pricing strategy of the rail 
incumbent has an upward effect on prices. Third, when moving from a monopoly situation to 
competition, the incumbent is submitted to a competitive pressure from its competitor, which 
tends to decrease its price. Fourth, while we consider an overall increase in total railway quality 
in all the simulated scenarios, the individual quality of each operator's offer remains at most equal 
to that of the incumbent today. Hence a lower individual quality level has a downward effect on 
prices. Simulating the different scenarios is then the only way to obtain the equilibrium prices that 
result from the combination of these conflicting forces. 
This drives us to the main result of our analysis on the opening to competition in the 
market: Whatever the scenario considered, if opening to competition leads to a total suppression 
of the price distortion (that is, µ=0), the incumbent's prices increase. Tables 2a and 2b indeed show 
that the price increase is comprised between 8% (in a symmetric scenario where each of the two 
operators has a quality of 50%) and 22% (a highly asymmetric scenario in which the rail incumbent 
keeps its current level of quality). 
What about the market shares of rail operators? In the highly asymmetrical case where the 
incumbent maintains its quality level at the status quo and the new entrant has only a 10% quality 
level, the market share of the new entrant is of the order of magnitude of 1% of the total market 
of potential passengers and 2% of actual passengers. This situation raises the question of the long-
term viability of this scenario. Now, in the symmetric scenarios where the two operators have a 
similar level of quality, their market share will be approximately 15% of potential travelers when 
the quality is fixed at 80% of the status quo level. 
Figure 1 in Appendix 3 summarizes the other main findings that one can draw from the 
reading of Tables 2a and 2b when the degree of price distortion is set to 0%. First, in some cases, 
the consumer surplus decreases which means that the passengers do not benefit from the 
improvement in the quality of the rail offer resulting from the diversification of the supply 
following from the multiplication of the number of operators. Second, the total amount of access 
charges collected decreases as a result of the contraction of the supply due to the price increase, 
itself being the consequence of the full relaxation of price distortions. The only exception is the 
case of a symetric case with 80% quality for both operators, and to a lesser extent in a asymetric 
scenario where the incumbent maintains its quality level and the new entrant is present with a 
quality of 50%. Third, the effect on the profit of rail operators is strongly positive although this 
increase essentially benefits the new entrant much more than the incumbent. 
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These conclusions heavily depend on the assumption of no price distortion, and are even 
reversed if the degree of price distortion is maintained at its current level. The results presented 
in Table A2a and 2b show that maintaining a high degree of price distortion makes it possible to 
ensure a positive change in the consumer surplus and the amount of access charges raised to the 
detriment of the profit of rail operators. The question is to evaluate whether scenarios with 
positive degrees of price distortion are realistic when the market is opened to competition. 
Summing up, the opening to competition in the market is highly uncertain in the sense 
that it strongly depends on whether the price distortion will be removed as well as on the quality 
of the new entrant which, in turn, is largely function of the level of access to the train paths it will 
obtain. In many cases, the effect of the opening to competition is relatively weak for the passenger 
or even negative if the price distortion disappears. It is mainly a transfer of profit from the 
incumbent to the new entrant. Since the two operators do not offer sufficiently high quality, the 
downward pressure on prices caused by competition and the fall in costs are not enough to offset 
the relaxation of price distortions. In other words, maintaining a price distortion is necessary in 
order to avoid a deterioration of the consumer surplus. 
 
5.4. Opening to competition for the market 
 
The scenarios for opening to competition for the market is modeled on the assumption 
that, following a call for tenders, the regulator is able to select an operator with operating costs 
10% lower than those of the incumbent with a level of quality close to that of the status quo. A 
variant with costs lower of 30% and lower quality is also presented in Table A3 of Appendix 2. It 
is assumed here that the structure and level of access charges are left unchanged from the status 
quo. 
When responding to the tender launched by the regulator to select the entity that will 
provide the transport service on a given market, each candidate operator indicates a level of 
subsidy that it requests if it anticipates that the profits generated will not be sufficient to cover the 
operating costs, or on the contrary, the lump sum that it is ready to offer to access the market. Our 
model does not allow us to study in detail how this upstream competition effectively work, and 
therefore does not allow us to evaluate the direct transfers that can be made between the operator 
and the regulator, part of which could be used to finance the fixed costs of the infrastructure. In 
what follows, when we focus on the financing of infrastructure, we only derive the levels of access 
charges that each scenario of opening to competition yields. How the financing of infrastructure 
impacts the mode of opening the rail market to competition is left for further research. 
In the case of an opening to competition for the market, it is not unconcievable to assume 
that the regulator might design the tender so as to impose constraints that would favor the 
consumer and therefore would allow a relative maintenance of the regulatory pressure on prices. 
The regulator could even choose a regulation more favorable to the consumers by increasing the 
tariff distortion. The rationale to do so is that, to some extent, the degree of price distortion informs 
how efficiencies related to the reduction of operational costs are shared between the passengers 
and the rail operator. In this perspective we propose to consider 6 scenarios of change in the 
degree of price distortion: Increase to 125%, increase to 110%, maintenance of the status quo at 
100%, transition to 67% and 33% of the status quo, disappearance of any tariff distortion at 0%. 
The results of these scenarios are displayed in Table A3. 
These results confirm the intuition. If the degree of price distortion is maintained at its 
current level (i.e., 100%), i.e. if the rail operator continues to maximize a weighted sum of its profit 
and the consumer surplus with a relative weight which remains identical to that of the status quo, 
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efficiency gains naturally translate into lower prices. More precisely, prices decrease by 3% in the 
10% cost-savings scenario and by 9% in the 30% cost-saving scenario; respectively consumer 
surplus slightly increases by 2% and + 8%, the operator's profit increases by 7% and 21%, and the 
revenus from the access charges increase by 5% and 15%. (See columns 5 and 11 of Table A3).  
Figure 2 in Appendix 3 summarizes some of the main findings that can be drawn from the 
inspection of Table A3. It displays the changes in the consumer surplus, the profit of the railway 
operator and the contribution of access charges to the financing of fixed costs infrastructure. 
By lessening the degree of price distortion, we change the way in which the efficiency 
gains are distributed among the different actors. The higher the price distortion (i.e., the weight 
placed on the consumer surplus), the lower the prices, and therefore the more favorable the 
change for passengers. Note that, since the amount of access charges collected is proportional to 
the volume of rail traffic, it varies in the opposite direction of rail prices, and therefore also 
increases with the degree of price distortion, while conversely, the profit of the rail operator 
evolves mechanically in the opposite direction. 
When the degree of price distorsion increases relative to the status quo (for example when 
it reaches 125%), the consumer surplus increases sharply by 9% in the scenario with a reduced 
cost of 10%. So does the contribution of access charges to the financing of infrastructure (+ 18%). 
On the contrary, the profit of the railway operator decreases by 12%. In the opposite extreme case 
where the opening to competition is accompanied by a removal of any price distortion, the 
consumer surplus and the access charges falls sharply from the status quo (by 16% and 33% 
respectively). Even in the most favorable scenario of a 30% reduction in operating costs, the 
efficiency gains of rail operator can not compensate the prices increase. 
 
5.5. Comparison of types of opening up to competition 
 
Table A4 provide a summary of some typical and relevant scenarios.  
A first conclusion is that the competition can bring benefits to the passenger only if the 
distortion of prices is maintained on the incumbent operator. In the case of competition for the 
market, it is conceivable to explicitly impose, in the call for tenders, this constraint of price 
distortion as a prerequisite for the operator to be selected to provide the transport service. By 
contrast, competition in the market seems to inevitably lead to a reduction of this "price 
distortion". 
A second conclusion is that the benefit for the passenger of opening up to competition in 
the market appears more uncertain: It becomes positive when the quality of the supply remains 
sufficient, and a significant price distortion is maintained on the historical operator (at least at a 
level of 66% according to our simulations reported in Table A4). The loss for the passenger 
becomes important when the price distortion is totally relaxed or when the diversification of the 
offer is very low with a new entrant providing only a low level of quality (a case reported in the 
last column of Table A4). Note that the fourth and fifth columns of Table A4 are relatively close 
to the "Italian" case where the new entrant and the incumbent have relatively close train path 
amounts, while the last column reflects more the "German" case, where the new entrant only gets 
a very limited number of train paths.  
 
5.6. The case of the business segment 
 
Table A5 provides the same information as Table A4 but for the business segment on the 
link between Paris and Bordeaux. It is straightforward to observe that the values in the two tables 
Competition For Versus In the Market of Long-Distance Passenger Rail Services 
 
- 18 - 
 
are very similar. In fact, if on the leisure segment there are more competitors, as a matter of fact 
only two are strategic competitors: air and rail. Then it is similar to the situation of the business 
segment since these are the only competitors here also. This mainly explains why the figures on 
the two tables are very close. Hence the lessons drawn from Table A4 apply here as well.  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
To our knowledge, the analysis carried out here constitutes the first simulation work 
providing a quantitative comparison of the methods of opening up to competition for versus in 
the market for the railway sector. The objective is to contribute to the debate on the modalities of 
opening to competition by bringing some quantified elements. Like any modeling work however, 
it does not have the ambition to answer all the questions, in particular it does not address many 
questions pertaining to the availability of rolling stocks, the management of train stations or the 
design of safety rules that could impact the process of opening to competition the rail services. 
We leave these questions for future research. 
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Appendix 1: The nested logit model for the new entrant case 
 
Here we extend our demand model using a nested logit to allow for a new alternative 
= 5j , called the new entrant, to appear in the same "group" or nest as the alternative 1, i.e., regular 
rail. The value of quality index of the new entrant is denoted by  5 . 
As before, the utility function associated with alternative j is written as: 
 
 =ij j ijU V . (A.1) 
 
We assume here that the error terms for the two rail alternatives, namely the rail incumbent and 
the new entrant, are correlated. Namely, they are specified as: 
 
     1 , 1= (1 )i i rail i , (A.2) 
 
and 
 
     5 , 5= (1 )i i rail i , (A.3) 
 
where  ,i rail  is a common random component while  1i  and  5i  are specific random 
components. These three components are assumed to be independently distributed so that each 
of them, as well as the errors terms ij , follows a standard extreme value distribution. The 
parameter   gives a measure of the degree of correlation between alternatives belonging to the 
group “rail”. It lies between 0 and 1. The higher  , the higher the correlation between alternatives 
in the rail group.  
Under these assumptions, the probability of choosing alternative j  is therefore: 
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and 
 
 
 
 
 




    
    
    
 
1
2,3,4 =1,5
exp
= for 2,3,4
exp exp
1
j
j
k
k
k k
V
s j
V
V
, (A.5) 
 
 
where 
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is the probability of choosing alternative j  conditional on having chosen the rail mode. 
Under this specification, we derive the demand functions 
 
         0ln ln = ln for = 1,5j j j j rails s hp s j , (A.7) 
 
and  
 
      0ln ln = for = 2,3,4j j js s hp j . (A.8) 
 
One therefore obtains the following own price elasticities of demand: 
 
  



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
= 1 (1 ) for = 1,5
1
j j j j j train
hp s hp s j  (A.9) 
 
and 
 
   = 1  for = 2, 3, 4j j jhp s j . (A.10) 
 
For fixed   and  , the equilibrium is fully characterized by the equations: 
 
 


 1 1
1 1
1
=
p c
p
, 

2 2
2 2
1
=
p c
p
 and 

5 5
5 5
1
=
p c
p
. (A.11) 
 
The system with three unknown, 1p , 2p , and 5p  can be solved numerically. 
 
In our simulations, we will fix the value of σ at 0.3.   
 
 
  
F. Cherbonnier – M. Ivaldi – C. Muller-Vibes – K. Van Der Straeten 
- 21 - 
 
Appendix 2: Tables 
 
Table A1: Impact of a change in the degree of price distortion on the status quo 
 
 Degree of Price Distortion 
 100% 66% 33% 0% 
Incumbent 
Marginal cost 24 
Access charge 25 
Prices (€) 
Rail 68 75 81 87 
Air 86 86 86 86 
Change in prices 
Rail 0 +9% +18% +27% 
Air 0 0 0 0 
Market shares 
Rail 28% 24% 21% 18% 
Air 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Car 19% 20% 21% 22% 
Car sharing 1% 1% 1% 1% 
No travel 47% 49% 51% 53% 
Change in 
market shares 
Rail 0 -14% -26% -37% 
Air 0 +5% +10% +14% 
Car 0 +6% +10% +14% 
Car sharing 0 +6% +10% +14% 
No travel 0 +6% +10% +14% 
Profits (en M€) 
Rail 15 17 18 18 
Air 4 4 5 5 
Change in 
profits 
Rail 0 +14% +21% +23% 
Air 0 +6% +10% +14% 
Access fees (M€) 16 13 12 10 
Change in access fees 0 -14% -26% -37% 
Consumer surplus 64 60 56 53 
Change in consumer surplus  0 -7% -13% -18% 
Notes: The unit M€ means millions of Euros. 
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Table A2a: Opening to competition in the market: Simulation results for the asymmetric scenarios 
 
Marginal cost 
Rail entrant 17 
Rail incumbent 21 
Access charge  25 
Quality level 
Rail entrant 10% 50% 50% 
Rail incumbent 100% 100% 80% 
Degree of price distortion 100% 66% 33% 0% 100% 66% 33% 0% 100% 66% 33% 0% 
Prices (€) 
Rail entrant 64 64 64 64 66 67 67 68 67 67 68 68 
Rail incumbent 66 72 78 84 64 69 74 79 62 68 72 77 
Air 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Change in prices 
Rail -3% +6% +14% +22% -7% +1% +9% +15% -9% -1% +6% +12% 
Air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Market shares 
Rail entrant 1 1 1 1 7 8 8 9 8 9 9 9 
Rail incumbent 29 25 22 19 28 24 21 18 22 19 17 14 
Air 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Car 19 20 21 22 18 18 19 20 19 19 20 21 
Car sharing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
No travel 45 48 50 52 42 44 46 47 45 47 48 49 
Change in market 
shares 
Rail incumbent +4% -10% -23% -33% -2% -15% -26% -36% -20% -31% -41% -49% 
Air -3% +3% +7% +11% -9% -5% -1% +2% -3% 0 +3% +6% 
Car -3% +3% +7% +11% -9% -5% -1% +2% -3% 0 +3% +6% 
Car sharing -3% +3% +7% +11% -9% -5% -1% +2% -3% 0 +3% +6% 
No travel -3% +3% +7% +11% -9% -5% -1% +2% -3% 0 +3% +6% 
Profits (en M€) 
Rail entrant 0 1 1 1 5 5 6 6 5 6 6 7 
Rail incumbent 15 18 19 19 13 15 16 16 10 11 12 12 
Rail 16 18 19 20 18 20 21 22 15 17 18 19 
Air 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Change in profits 
Rail incumbent +4% +19% +26% +28% -13% -1% +5% +7% -35% -26% -21% -20% 
Rail +7% +22% +30% +32% +19% +35% +44% +49% +1% +14% +22% +26% 
Access fees (M€) 17 15 13 11 19 18 16 15 17 15 14 13 
Change in access fees +7% -7% -19% -29% +24% +13% +3% -4% +8% -1% -9% -15% 
Consumer surplus 67 62 58 55 72 68 65 63 67 64 61 59 
Change in consumer surplus  +4% -4% -9% -14% +13% +7% +2% -2% +4% 0% -4% -8% 
Notes: The unit M€ means millions of Euros. 
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Table A2b: Opening to competition in the market: Simulation results for the symmetric scenarios 
 
Marginal cost 
Rail entrant 17 
Rail incumbent 21 
Access charge  25 
Quality level 
Rail entrant 80% 50% 
Rail incumbent 80% 50% 
Degree of price distortion 100% 66% 33% 0% 100% 66% 33% 0% 
Prices (€) 
Rail entrant 70 70 71 72 69 69 70 70 
Rail incumbent 61 66 70 75 60 65 69 74 
Air 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Change in prices 
Rail -11% -4% +3% +9% -12% -5% +1% +8% 
Air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Market shares 
Rail entrant 14 15 15 15 9 10 10 10 
Rail incumbent 21 18 15 13 14 12 10 9 
Air 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Car 18 18 19 19 21 21 21 22 
Car sharing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
No travel 42 44 45 46 50 51 52 52 
Change in market 
shares 
Rail incumbent -27% -37% -45% -53% -50% -57% -64% -69% 
Air -9% -6% -3% -1% +6% +8% +10% +12% 
Car -9% -6% -3% -1% +6% +9% +11% +12% 
Car sharing -9% -6% -3% -1% +6% +9% +11% +12% 
No travel -9% -6% -3% -1% +6% +9% +11% +12% 
Profits (en M€) 
Rail entrant 10 11 12 12 7 7 8 8 
Rail incumbent 8 9 10 10 5 6 6 6 
Rail 19 21 22 23 12 13 14 14 
Air 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Change in profits 
Rail incumbent -45% -37% -33% -31% -65% -60% -57% -56% 
Rail +25% +39% +48% +53% -19% -11% -5% -2% 
Access fees (M€) 19 18 17 16 13 12 11 11 
Change in access fees +23% +15% +8% +2% -16% -22% -27% -32% 
Consumer surplus 72 69 67 65 59 57 56 54 
Change in consumer surplus  +12% +8% +4% +1% -8% -11% -13% -15% 
Notes: The unit M€ means millions of Euros. 
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Table A3: Opening to competition for the market: Simulation results 
 
Marginal cost Rail 21 17 
Access charge  25 
Quality level Rail 100% 
Degree of price distortion 125% 110% 100% 66% 33% 0% 125% 110% 100% 66% 33% 0% 
Prices (€) 
Rail 61 64 66 73 79 85 57 60 62 69 75 81 
Air 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Change in prices 
Rail -11% -6% -3% +7% +5% +24% -17% -12% -9% +1% +10% +18% 
Air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Market shares 
Rail 33 31 29 25 22 19 36 34 32 28 24 21 
Air 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Car 18 19 19 20 21 22 17 18 18 19 20 21 
Car sharing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
No travel 43 45 46 48 51 53 41 43 44 47 49 51 
Change in market 
shares 
Rail +18% +10% +5% -10% -23% -33% +28% +20% +15% -1% -15% -26% 
Air -7% -4% -2% +4% +8% +12% -11% -7% -5% 0 +5% +10% 
Car -7% -4% -2% +4% +9% +13% -11% -8% -6% +1% +6% +10% 
Car sharing -7% -4% -2% +4% +9% +13% -11% -8% -6% +1% +6% +10% 
No travel -7% -4% -2% +4% +9% +13% -11% -8% -6% +1% +6% +10% 
Profits (en M€) 
Rail 13 15 16 18 19 19 15 17 18 20 22 22 
Air 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Change in profits 
Rail -12% 0 +7% +22% +29% +31% 0 +14% +21% +38% +46% +48% 
Air -7% -4% -2% +4% +9% +13% -11% -8% -6% +1% +6% +10% 
Access fees (M€) 18 17 16 14 12 10 20 19 18 15 13 12 
Change in access fees +18% +10% +5% -10% -23% -33% +28% +20% +15% -1% -15% -26% 
Consumer surplus 70 67 66 61 57 54 74 71 69 64 59 56 
Change in consumer surplus +9% +5% +2% -5% -11% -16% +15% +11% +8% -1% -7% -13% 
Notes: The unit M€ means millions of Euros. 
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Table A4: Comparison of types of opening up to competition (leisure segment – Paris-Marseille market) 
 
Type of competition For the market In the market 
Quality level of rail operators 100% 100% 100% 80%-50% 80%-50% 100%-10% 
Degree of price distortion 100% 66% 0% 66% 0% 0% 
Change in consumer surplus +2% -5% -16% +0% -8% -14% 
Change in profit +7% +22% +31% +14% +26% +32% 
Change in access charges +5% -10% -33% -1% -15% -29% 
Note: i) In case of opening for the market, the quality parameter is that of the franchised operator; in the case of opening in 
the market, the first value for the quality level is that of the historical operator and the second one, that of the new entrant. 
ii) In case of opening for the market, the tariff distortion is exerted on the franchised operator; in case of opening on the 
market, the tariff distortion is exerted only on the incumbent operator, the new entrant being supposed to maximize its 
profit of the short term. iii) In the case of competition for the market, the marginal cost of the operator is 10% lower than 
that of the incumbent. iv) In the case of competition in the market, the marginal cost of the incumbent is now 10% lower 
than it was in the status quo, and the marginal cost of the new entrant is 30% lower than that of the incumbent originally. 
 
 
Table A5: Comparison of types of opening up to competition (business segment – Paris-Bordeaux market) 
 
Type of competition For the market In the market 
Quality level of rail operators 100% 100% 100% 80%-50% 80%-50% 100%-10% 
Degree of price distortion 100% 66% 0% 66% 0% 0% 
Change in consumer surplus +2% -9% -25% -5% -15% -23% 
Change in profit +4% +24% +36% +13% +28% +37% 
Change in access charges +3% -13% -37% -7% -22% -34% 
Note: The comments on Table A4 also apply here. 
 
Competition For Versus In the Market of Long-Distance Passenger Rail Services 
 
- 26 - 
 
Appendix 3: Figures 
 
Figure 1: Opening to competition in the market: Summary of main findings 
 
 
Figure 2: Opening to competition for the market: Summary of main findings 
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